Conan_Kudo / build / midipix_build

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--- libarchive-3.1.2/build/autoconf/config.sub.orig	2013-02-09 18:23:12.000000000 +0100
+++ libarchive-3.1.2/build/autoconf/config.sub	2016-03-08 12:37:36.382751400 +0100
@@ -789,6 +789,10 @@
 	microblaze*)
 		basic_machine=microblaze-xilinx
 		;;
+	midipix)
+		basic_machine=x86_64-pc
+		os=-midipix
+		;;
 	mingw64)
 		basic_machine=x86_64-pc
 		os=-mingw64
@@ -1365,7 +1369,7 @@
 	      | -udi* | -eabi* | -lites* | -ieee* | -go32* | -aux* \
 	      | -chorusos* | -chorusrdb* | -cegcc* \
 	      | -cygwin* | -msys* | -pe* | -psos* | -moss* | -proelf* | -rtems* \
-	      | -mingw32* | -mingw64* | -linux-gnu* | -linux-android* \
+	      | -midipix* | -mingw32* | -mingw64* | -linux-gnu* | -linux-android* \
 	      | -linux-newlib* | -linux-musl* | -linux-uclibc* \
 	      | -uxpv* | -beos* | -mpeix* | -udk* \
 	      | -interix* | -uwin* | -mks* | -rhapsody* | -darwin* | -opened* \
--- libarchive-3.1.2/cpio/bsdcpio.1.orig
+++ libarchive-3.1.2/cpio/bsdcpio.1
@@ -156,7 +156,8 @@
 .It Fl Fl insecure
 (i and p mode only)
 Disable security checks during extraction or copying.
-This allows extraction via symbolic links and path names containing
+This allows extraction via symbolic links, absolute paths,
+and path names containing
 .Sq ..
 in the name.
 .It Fl J , Fl Fl xz
--- libarchive-3.1.2/cpio/cpio.c.orig
+++ libarchive-3.1.2/cpio/cpio.c
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@
 	cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_NO_OVERWRITE_NEWER;
 	cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS;
 	cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
+	cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS;
 	cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_PERM;
 	cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_FFLAGS;
 	cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_ACL;
@@ -264,6 +265,7 @@
 		case OPTION_INSECURE:
 			cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS;
 			cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
+			cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS;
 			break;
 		case 'L': /* GNU cpio */
 			cpio->option_follow_links = 1;
@@ -300,6 +302,7 @@
 				    "Cannot use both -p and -%c", cpio->mode);
 			cpio->mode = opt;
 			cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
+			cpio->extract_flags &= ~ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS;
 			break;
 		case OPTION_PRESERVE_OWNER:
 			cpio->extract_flags |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_OWNER;
--- libarchive-3.1.2/libarchive/archive.h.orig
+++ libarchive-3.1.2/libarchive/archive.h
@@ -562,6 +562,8 @@
 /* Default: Do not use HFS+ compression if it was not compressed. */
 /* This has no effect except on Mac OS v10.6 or later. */
 #define	ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_HFS_COMPRESSION_FORCED	(0x8000)
+/* Default: Do not reject entries with absolute paths */
+#define ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS (0x10000)
 
 __LA_DECL int archive_read_extract(struct archive *, struct archive_entry *,
 		     int flags);
--- libarchive-3.1.2/libarchive/archive_write_disk.3.orig
+++ libarchive-3.1.2/libarchive/archive_write_disk.3
@@ -177,6 +177,9 @@
 Note that paths ending in
 .Pa ..
 always cause an error, regardless of this flag.
+.It Cm ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS
+Refuse to extract an absolute path.
+The default is to not refuse such paths.
 .It Cm ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SPARSE
 Scan data for blocks of NUL bytes and try to recreate them with holes.
 This results in sparse files, independent of whether the archive format
--- libarchive-3.1.2/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c.orig
+++ libarchive-3.1.2/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
@@ -2504,8 +2504,9 @@
 /*
  * Canonicalize the pathname.  In particular, this strips duplicate
  * '/' characters, '.' elements, and trailing '/'.  It also raises an
- * error for an empty path, a trailing '..' or (if _SECURE_NODOTDOT is
- * set) any '..' in the path.
+ * error for an empty path, a trailing '..', (if _SECURE_NODOTDOT is
+ * set) any '..' in the path or (if ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS
+ * is set) if the path is absolute.
  */
 static int
 cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
@@ -2524,8 +2525,15 @@
 	cleanup_pathname_win(a);
 #endif
 	/* Skip leading '/'. */
-	if (*src == '/')
+	if (*src == '/') {
+		if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS) {
+			archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
+			                  "Path is absolute");
+			return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
+		}
+
 		separator = *src++;
+	}
 
 	/* Scan the pathname one element at a time. */
 	for (;;) {
--- libarchive-3.1.2/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure.c.orig
+++ libarchive-3.1.2/libarchive/test/test_write_disk_secure.c
@@ -178,6 +178,29 @@
 	assert(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode));
 	archive_entry_free(ae);
 
+	/*
+	 * Without security checks, we should be able to
+	 * extract an absolute path.
+	 */
+	assert((ae = archive_entry_new()) != NULL);
+	archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
+	archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFREG | 0777);
+	assert(0 == archive_write_header(a, ae));
+	assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
+	assertFileExists("/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
+	assert(0 == unlink("/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp"));
+
+	/* But with security checks enabled, this should fail. */
+	assert(archive_entry_clear(ae) != NULL);
+	archive_entry_copy_pathname(ae, "/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
+	archive_entry_set_mode(ae, S_IFREG | 0777);
+	archive_write_disk_set_options(a, ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS);
+	failure("Extracting an absolute path should fail here.");
+	assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_FAILED, archive_write_header(a, ae));
+	archive_entry_free(ae);
+	assert(0 == archive_write_finish_entry(a));
+	assertFileNotExists("/tmp/libarchive_test-test_write_disk_secure-absolute_path.tmp");
+
 	assertEqualInt(ARCHIVE_OK, archive_write_free(a));
 
 	/* Test the entries on disk. */
--- libarchive-3.1.2/libarchive/archive_write.c.orig	2016-06-03 13:15:42.862830537 +0000
+++ libarchive-3.1.2/libarchive/archive_write.c	2016-06-03 13:19:01.590826126 +0000
@@ -671,8 +671,12 @@
 _archive_write_data(struct archive *_a, const void *buff, size_t s)
 {
 	struct archive_write *a = (struct archive_write *)_a;
+	const size_t max_write = INT_MAX;
 	archive_check_magic(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_WRITE_MAGIC,
 	    ARCHIVE_STATE_DATA, "archive_write_data");
+	/* In particular, this catches attempts to pass negative values. */
+	if (s > max_write)
+		s = max_write;
 	archive_clear_error(&a->archive);
 	return ((a->format_write_data)(a, buff, s));
 }